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Successful plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976 
(hereafter referred to as the ADEAY may recover lost pay from the date of 
termination until trial (back pay) plus the pay they would have received from the 
date of trial until retirement age (front pay). While courts can easily calculate back 
pay, including fringe benefits and interest, it has proven far more difficult to accurately 
calculate front pay. A typical description of front pay as "a lump swn representing the 
discounted present value of the difference between the earnings an employee would 
have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive in 
his present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment"2 requires the court to 
speculate about the amount an employee would have received in the future until some 
hypothetical retirement date. The difficulty of calculating front pay with any degree of 
certll.inty makes such damages an inappropriate remedy in age discrimination cases. 
The concept of front pay does not appear in the ADEA itself. The remedies 
section simply says that civil actions may be brought "for such legal or equitable relief 
as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter," and "legal and equitable relief ... 
includes ... without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or 
promotion".3 Thus, Congress has given the courts broad authority to fashion remedies 
and front pay is the innovative remedial scheme that has emerged. Front pay was first 
proposed in law review articles which suggested that the usual remedies were 
insufficient to make whole certain workers who had been victims of discrimination. 
One author even argued that when reinstatement is not appropriate, the only way to 
make a plaintiff whole is with a front pay award.4 
·Professor, Southwest Texas State University. 
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So long as the "nonnal" retirement age was 65, there were various approaches 
to implementing front pay that minimized the speculative nature of the calculations. 
However, in 1986 the ADEA was amended to prohibit mandatory retirement and to 
eliminate any reference to a "normal" retirement age5. With the demise of a fixed 
retirement age, calculating the proper amount of front pay to award has become a more 
difficult task for cowts and juries and the result has been some very speculative 
awards. 
Reinstatement or Front Pay? 
Reinstatement is the preferred remedy in discrimination cases. Courts often 
state the "rule" that reinstatement should suffice unless there are special factors 
involved which dictate a resort to :front pay, described as a "special" remedy, 
warranted only by "egregious circumstances.'r6 Therefore, it could be expected that 
front pay awards would be limited to situations involving discord or antagonism in the 
workplace that would render reinstatement ineffective. Trial courts must consider 
reinstatement before submitting the issue of front pay to the jmy. The trial record in 
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.7 did not indicate why the district comt considered 
reinstatement impossible and the only evidence was the employers testimony that it 
considered the employee a qualified and competent employee capable of resuming 
work The Fifth Circuit found the district court's statement that the litigation was 
"protracted and necessarily vexing" to be insufficient to support an award of front 
pay.s 
However, ordering reinstatement forces judges to supervise a coerced 
employment relationship. As a result, the use of front pay has become more and more 
common. Front pay instead of reinstatement has been ordered where 1) "discord, 
tension, suspicion, antagonism and sensitivity among (employees) would be 
productive of a very difficult employment environment"9 , 2) the employee's former 
job "requ]red a close working relationship (with) top executives of defendant'' 10, and 
3) the claimant is "nearing" the normal retirement age anyway. 11 Even plaintiffs who 
request reinstatement sometimes end up with front pay instead, the court having found 
reinstatement "impracticable". The jmy in Price v. Marshall Erdman & Associates. 
Inc. 12 awarded Price $750,000 in front pay, but he wanted to be reinstated instead 
The court refused to order reinstatement because of "mutual dislike and defendants' 
continued opinion that plaintiff is incompetent", reasoning that "if the employee 
dislikes the idea of working for the employer or the employer dislikes the idea of 
having the employee work for him, reinstatement should not be ordered."13 Price was 
a salesman who spent much of his working time away from the office and so was not 
constantly in touch with his enemies; nevertheless, the judge noted that 
"it is one thing to order the reinstatement of low-level 
employees performing routine tasks, or higher-level employees after the 
supervisors involved in the unlawful employment action have left the 
company or been transferred to another division, but to order 
reinstatement of a high-level employee performing discretionary 
functions into the division from which he was fired and which remains 
under the management of the person who fired him is a formula for 
continuous judicial intervention in the employment relation. If Price ·is 
reinstated, every time he is denied credit for a sale, or denied a raise or 
a bonus, or has a squabble with (the supervisor), he will be tempted to 
nm to the district cowt". 14 
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In Lewis v. Federal Prison Industries. Inc. 15 the comt found it reasonable for 
Lewis to refuse reinstatement after a psychiatrist testified that Lewis experienced · a " 
reactive depression" in response to the discriminatoty acts that occurred at the 
company and that, although Lewis' health had improved since he left, his symptoms 
would retwn if he went back to work at the company. There was also evidence that 
Lewis had only four years tmtil the date of his mandatory retirement16. In an earlier 
case17 the employee, a lawyer. was awarded front pay because the animosity between 
employee and employer was so intense that reinstatement was impossible. The court 
specifically noted that the time period in this case was relatively short, approximately 
four years, and thus did not involve some of the tmcertainties which might surround a 
front pay award to a younger worker. 
Although the trial court ordered reinstatement in U.S. Equal Employment 
Oooortunitv Comm'n v. Centmv Broadcasting Corp .. 18 it was reversed because the 
judge had not given a sufficient for withholding front pay. The case involved 
a radio station which had terminated all ann01mcers over the age of 40. The trial court 
ordered that the announcers be rehired but the Cowt of Appeals would not allow this 
because "reinstatement would disrupt the operation of the station and would displace 
annotmcers currently employed" and "station management does not have confidence 
(. ) th " 19 m ese announcers .... 
The case that best illustrates the willingness of the courts to substitute front pay 
for reinstatement is Bucldey v. Reynolds Metals Co.20 The judge had ordered that 
Buckley be reinstated immediately to his old position or to a substantially equivalent 
position. However, after eight months of fruitless negotiations, the parties stipulated 
that Buckley would seek an award of front pay instead. The cowt agreed, concluding 
that reinstatement was impossible or impracticable because the parties said it was! 
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Calculating the Amount of Front Pay 
If the trial court detennines that a plaintiff is entitled to front pay, then the jury 
must determine the amount of damages. Factors to be considered are the employee's 
work and life expectancy, discount tables to deter:nllne the present value of future 
damages., the choice of an appropriate discount rate, and other factors that are pertinent 
to all types of prospective damage awards.21 Some of this evidence, like the discount 
tables, is objective; but how is a judge or july to know how long the plaintiff actually 
would have remained working at the job, whether he soon would have left for a 
different, perhaps better-paying job, or whether the plaintiff soon would have been 
dismissed for legitimate reasons'f2 Often the only source of such data, which is 
necessary to calculate a reasonably certain front pay award, is the testimony of the 
parties and their experts. 
In Forest Electric Com. v. Murtha23 the employee testified that he was in 
excellent physical condition and enjoyed working with the people at Forest Electric so 
much that he would have worked until he was seventy-three to seventy-five years old. 
He also testi::fied that he was earning $49,406 per year at the time he was terminated at 
age 66. Based on this evidence, and on evidence of earning history and fringe 
benefits, and based on reasonable asswnptions about increases in earnings due to 
economic conditions, Murtha's expert economist declared that Mmtha would have 
earned approximately $377,000 in the period from his tennination until age 
seventy-three, if he worked to that age. The expert stated that worl< life was a fact 
which varied too much from person to person to use general tables to estimate it.24 
The company countered with the testimony of a statistician rather than an economist. 
He testified that Murtha would probably have worked until age seventy, based on what 
the typical man who was working at age sixty-six would do. Asswning he retired at 
age seventy, Mwtha's economic loss until retirement would have been $69,713.25 The 
jmy accepted Murtha's expert and concluded that he would have worked to the age of 
seventy-one to seventy-three. The front pay award was $200,000. 
In Doyne v. Union Electric Co.26 the employee testified that he planned to 
work until age 70 and that he had so informed Union Electric. One of Union Electric's 
own witnesses testified that prior to Doyne's termination he told another employee 
that he intended to work wrtil age 70. The july awarded $273,993.00 in front pay 
based on this testimony but the trial judge reduced the amount to $19,610.66 after 
declaring that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Doyne 
would have remained employed with UE until age seventy and that the front pay 
award should be based on retirement at the age of 65.27 The Court of Appeals sided 
with the jmy and reinstated the $273,993.00 award.28 
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longer a proposed front pay period the more speculative the damages 
Awards have been allowed involving as much as fow- years between the 
trial date the date when compulsory retirement could have been imposed30 but it is 
the total not the length of time until retirement, that detennines 
whether a award IS speculative. Mr. Buckley, for example, sought an 
to cover_ a year penod, which under other circumstances might exceed the 
limits of pemusstble speculation. However, Buckley had worked for Reynolds for 
than twenty-five years when he was fired; he had nine years to won before 
retirement 1?ere was no reason to reject his assertion that he intended to remain at 
Reynolds until he reached the regular retirement age of sixty-five. It was also 
reaso_nable to assume the illegal discharge he would have been able to 
remam at Reynolds until he planned to retire. In view of his age, it was unlikely that 
would voluntarily switch jobs again or embark on a new career path. Final! 
the mdustry where Bucldey_was employed: provided relatively steady and 
employment. Under these CU"ClUDS1:ances nme years did not seem tmduly speculative. 31 
that have been considered unduly speculative have arisen in situations 
the discharged employee is only forty years old or so, or where the award 
IDJght ten years rn: mon: which the employee, had he not been 
discharged but continued m his employment, might or might not get raises, 
reductJons, incapacitated.32 For example, the employees in Rengers v. 
Radio of front pay but the evidence indicated 
that m a fickle mdusfry like radio, JOb secunty for disk jockeys is quite tenuous and so 
the re£Usc:d to that the would have remained employed at 
the stanon retirement. In Price , the employee's expert witness estimated 
rangmg $1.2 if Price retired at the age of 65 to $2.1 million if he 
retired. 75 but_ failed to disco1.mt each year's projected earnings loss by the 
probability that would have lived long enough to obtain those earnings. The 
com: thought that smce the probability was not a htmdred percent the estimate of lost 
earnmgs should have been scaled down accordingly. The cowt decided a bigg 
prob_lem was the expert's failw-e to take into account the high volatility of a sal eanungs: esmans 
. ''the figures the expert projected may be the best possible 
of... mean expected earnings had (the employee) remained 
Wlth (the employer), but the variance around that mean must be 
persons-and most people are assumed to be 
nsk-averse m therr senous financial affairs-will pay a premium, ft 
1 "d . o en a vety o_ne, to avot nsk ... (A) person who did not mind risk would 
not be willing to pay a loading charge-he would prefer to take his 
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chances on the loss's occurring or not ... The award in effect enabled 
(the employee) to exchange his risky expectations ... for a risk- free 
asset having the same expected value but, assuming (the employee) is 
risk averse, a substantially higher utility. "35 
Front pay awards will not be upheld if there is no evidence in the record to 
support the calculations. For example, in Hvbert v. Hearsf<i the court 
that 1) the employee would continue to work at his present rate of productiVity. until 
the age of72 (he was 67 when the trial ended); 2) the employer would have contmued 
to employ the employee in his last-held position until he retired at the age of 72; and 3) 
that the employer would have continued to employ the employee at his last-held sala:ry 
level for five more years until he retired at 12?1 Since there was no evidence to 
support any of these assumptions, the front pay award reversed. 
The Dutv to Mitigate 
To be entitled to an award of front pay a plaintiff must make reasonable 
attempts at mitigation. The employer can avoid liability by showing that there were 
suitable positions available elsewhere and that the employee failed to use reasonable 
care in seeking them. For example, in Leeds v. Sexson38 the employee was not 
entitled to an award of front pay because he failed to remain in the labor market and 
failed to diligently search for alternative wotk The employee in Rodgers v. Western-
Southern Life Insurance Co?9 was not to a front pay award because he 
declined an offer of reinstatement and failed to show that it would have been 
infeasible or inappropriate for him to return. The jury instructions in Gries v. Zimmer. 
Inc.40 offer a concise statement of the duty to mitigate: the judge told the jury that if 
the plaintiff "failed to make reasonable efforts to find a new job, you sh?uld 
from his damages any amount that be could have earned in a new JOb after his 
discharge". 41 
How long does an employee have to find comparable employment? The 
answer depends on the circmnstan.ces. In Fite v. First Tennessee ProduCtion _Credit 
Assn42 the employee postponed seeking other employment for a year m the 
expectation that he would be reinstated. When it became apparent that this would not 
happen. be vigorously sought other employment. Given these circmnstances, the co_urt 
gave him more than three years to find comparable employment before subtractmg 
from his dam.ages.43 
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Should Front Pay be Doubled? 
The ADEA calls for the doubling of damages in the case of a willful violation. 
Should this doubling apply to front pay awards? In Olitskv v. S oencer Gifts. Inc. 44, the 
employee argued that the court should have doubled the jury's award of $400,000 front 
pay after finding that Spencer Gifts acted willfully and the Fifth Circuit agreed: " ... to 
exclude front pay would make no sense. for an award of double damages might wen 
fall short of compensation and thus contain no punitive component at all (in fact 
contain a negative punitive component). In such a case the plaintiff might be better 
offifthe violation were adjudged notwillfu1".45 
On the other hand, several courts have held that the liquidated damages 
provision of ADEA does not apply to front pay awards.46 If front pay is exclusively an 
equitable award it is not subject to doubling. One court has even considered double 
back pay and front pay as mutually exclusive47. Clearly, the availability of double 
damages is one of the circumstances courts look at when deciding whether to 
award front pay at all. In Lee v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist.48 the court entered 
judgment for $22,140 for back pay, $39,664.85 for front pay, and $10,000 for double 
damages, citing its "discretiotwy" authority regarding double damages while noting 
that the plaintiff had already received an award of front pay.49 Even more courts are 
likely to multiply speculative front pay awards since the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Hazen Pape?O that broadly defines the term willful. 
Smnmaty and Conclusions 
The phrase "without limitation" in the damages section of the ADEA invites 
federal courts to be imaginative in devising alternative remedies and front pay has been 
one result Initially, front pay was said to be appropriate only when the other damages 
awarded did not fully compensate the plaintiff for his injuries; subsequently, it has 
become the remedy of choice where reinstatement is not feasible in a wide range of 
cases. Front pay is being used to compensate employees until retirement even though . 
the discrimination has ceased. This is a windfall, not restitution, says the Lewis 
dissent,s1 and it creates an incentive for the discharged employee to remain 
unemployed and for the employer to settle the case without addressing the possible age 
discrimination in the workplace. If front pay was not available, the employee would 
have little incentive to prosecute a frivolous claim. 52 
Congress did not include front pay as a remedy in the ADEA. It was 
incorporated by the federal district courts from other civil rights and labor laws. There 
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is no need for such a liberal construction of the act and, given the difficulties. of 
calculation of front pay and the resulting speculative nature of the award, it is time to 
consider the wisdom of the widespread use of this remedy. There is no evidence in the 
case law that companies are so hostile to fired workers that it is impossible for them to 
return and reinstatement should be the remedy in all but the most exceptional cases. 
Front pay damages were originally allowed only in such exceptional cases and there 
may still be such a use for them. but the widespread use of front pay is inconsistent 
with the purposes of the ADEA and valid social policy. 
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